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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of private pensions on the retirement wealth
distribution. The model incorporates stochastic private pension coverage into a life-
cycle model with stochastic earnings. The predictions of the calibrated model are
compared to the distribution of retirement net worth and private pension wealth in
the PSID. While private pensions lead to higher wealth inequality and reduces the
lifetime earnings - retirement wealth correlation, the model still generates too little
wealth inequality. However, when we extend the model to include heterogeneous
life-cycle earnings profiles and permanent return differences across households, we
find that the model largely accounts for the sizeable variation in retirement wealth.
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1 Introduction
Although there is a large literature on wealth inequality using quantitative life cycle
models (e.g. Huggett (1996), De Nardi (2004), Cagetti and De Nardi (2008)), relatively
little attention has been paid to employer sponsored pension plans.1 This is surprising,
as employer provided pension plans represent a significant share of household retirement
wealth, with estimates ranging from 20 - 40 % of total retirement saving (Munnell and
Perun (2006), Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2010)). In addition, pension cover-
age is incomplete as not all employers offer private pensions (Buessing and Soto (2006)),
which may lead lead to different saving rates for workers with and without access to
employer provided pensions.
This paper tackles this gap in the literature, and undertakes a quantitative exami-
nation of the impact of private pensions on the U.S. retirement wealth distribution. To
address this issue, we incorporate private pensions into an incomplete market life-cycle
model calibrated to the U.S. economy. In the model, households face stochastic income,
and as in the data, the probability of a household having pension coverage is persis-
tent and positively correlated with income. Given the interest in retirement wealth, the
model also incorporates a public pension system (Social Security) which depends upon
a household’s lifetime earnings, and stochastic inheritances.2
We use this model to address two closely related questions. First, do private pensions
have a quantitatively large impact on the distribution of retirement wealth? Second, can
private pensions help account for two discrepancies between the “standard” life cycle
model and the data documented by Hendricks (2007b): for reasonable parameter values,
the life-cycle model generates (i) too little variation in retirement wealth between house-
holds with similar lifetime earnings; and (ii) the model implies too tight a relationship
between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth.
To evaluate and discipline our model results we use the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID) to construct estimates of retirement wealth and lifetime earnings. We
make use of the fact that since 1999 the PSID supplemental wealth survey has included
questions on employer provided pensions. This allows us to compare two measures of
household wealth at retirement: one based on net worth and a more comprehensive
1Notable exceptions to this include Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999).
2While we abstract from a bequest motive in our benchmark environment, we find that extending
the model to include an explicit bequest motive does not impact our main results.
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measure which includes the present value of private pensions.3
We find that private pensions are a significant fraction of PSID retirement wealth,
accounting for roughly 25 % of total private (excluding social security) retirement wealth.
Although pension wealth is more unequally distributed than non-pension wealth (roughly
fifty percent of households have a private pension), including pensions in retirement
wealth lowers inequality, as the Gini is 0.62 versus 0.65 for net worth. We also find that
the correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth is higher when pension
wealth is included in retirement wealth. Interestingly, the correlation between retirement
wealth and earnings varies across income groups, with the top half of lifetime earnings
having a much higher wealth-earnings correlations than the bottom 50 percent.
We follow Venti and Wise (1998) and examine the distribution of retirement wealth
within lifetime earnings deciles. Similar to Venti and Wise (1998) and Hendricks (2007b),
we find significant dispersion in retirement wealth within lifetime earnings deciles.4 In-
cluding private pensions lowers within decile wealth inequality, with the average Gini
coefficient within lifetime earnings deciles declining from 0.55 for net worth to 0.51 for
total private retirement wealth. We also find that private pensions increase mean saving
rates for each decile of lifetime earners by roughly two percentage points.
We simulate the model economy, calibrated to U.S. data, with and without a private
pension system. While private pensions have a significant impact on retirement wealth,
the quantitative effect on retirement net worth inequality is roughly half as large as
Social Security. This is due to the very different coverage and replacement rates of the
two pensions systems. We also find, as suggested by Huggett and Ventura (2000), that
the U.S. social security system encourages higher savings rates for households with high
lifetime earnings even in the presence of private pensions. However, our model suggests
that this effect can account for only a third of the difference between the average saving
rates of the top two deciles of lifetime earners and middle earners.
We find that private pensions can partially account for the discrepancies between the
life-cycle model and the data emphasized by Hendricks (2007b). Private pensions lead
to a more unequal retirement net worth distribution, with the mean Gini for net worth
within lifetime earnings deciles increasing to 0.49 from 0.39 in the no pension economy.
This accounts for nearly two-thirds of the difference between the standard life cycle
3The lack of information on employer provided pension plans in earlier waves is why Hendricks
(2007b)) abstracts from private pension wealth.
4Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001) use data from the PSID and the CEX to examine retire-
ment wealth heterogeneity.
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model and the PSID Gini of 0.55. While the correlation between retirement net worth
and lifetime earnings is lower in the pension than the no-pension model economy, at 0.80
it remains well above the 0.64 observed in the PSID. However, the model correlations
for the top (bottom) half of lifetime earners are much closer to the PSID estimates.
While the life-cycle model with private pensions can largely account for the distri-
bution of retirement net worth, the model understates the degree of inequality in total
retirement wealth (net worth plus private pensions). The reflects two key differences
between the joint distribution of pension and non-pension wealth in the model and data.
First, virtually all model households with high lifetime earnings and low net worth have
private pensions, while in the PSID many high earners with low net worth lack pen-
sions. Second, the pension offset effect in the model is larger than in the data. As a
result, the model generates too few households with high earnings and large pension and
non-pension retirement wealth.
This leads us to introduce two additional mechanisms which may increase the disper-
sion of retirement wealth: earnings profile heterogeneity and rate of return heterogeneity.
We find that the life cycle model augmented to include private pensions, return and pro-
file heterogeneity can largely account for the dispersion of retirement wealth, as the
model closely matches the data Gini for both non-pension retirement wealth (0.67 ver-
sus 0.65 in the data) and total retirement wealth (0.60 versus 0.62 in the data). The
Gini of retirement net worth within lifetime earnings deciles is close to the data: with a
cross-decile mean of 0.47 versus 0.51 in the PSID. While the correlation between earn-
ings and retirement net worth remains higher in the model, at 0.72, than the data, 0.64,
the correlations within the top and bottom half of lifetime earners are very close to the
data. The correlation between net worth and lifetime earners for the top half (bottom)
of earners is 0.72 (0.18) in the model versus 0.71 (0.14) in the PSID.
These positive results are tempered by a continued discrepancy between the model
predictions and the data for households with pensions. While the model now generates a
number of high earners without pensions with low retirement wealth, it generates too few
households with large pension and non-pension wealth. This is driven by a larger pension
offset effect in the model than in the data. As a result, mean savings rates for households
with pensions in the PSID are higher than predicted by the model. Interestingly, this
leads to an opposite problem from Hendricks (2007b), as the model now generates more
dispersion in retirement net worth than in the data.
Our results have important implications for the debate over what drives the large
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variation in retirement wealth. Venti and Wise (1998), Hendricks (2007b) and Hendricks
(2007a) argue that a large amount of the observed dispersion in retirement wealth is
due to differences in savings propensities, possibly due to heterogeneity in household
preferences. Our findings suggest preference heterogeneity may play a smaller role. Not
only does the model extended to include pensions, profile and return heterogeneity largely
account for retirement wealth dispersion, it also moves the model predictions for life-cycle
wealth inequality closer to the data. Hence, while our findings do not fully account for the
quantitative differences between the life-cycle model and the data, they greatly reduce
the gap to be explained by preference heterogeneity.
There is a large related literature which uses quantitative life cycle models to ex-
amine wealth inequality.5 While much of this literature largely abstracts from private
pensions, several related papers on the adequacy of household retirement savings have
incorporated private pensions.6 In an important contribution, Engen, Gale, and Uccello
(1999) introduce private pension coverage into a life cycle model where households face
stochastic income. Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006) compare household specific
wealth holdings predicted by a stochastic life cycle model with data from the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS). They conclude that most HRS households have accumu-
lated more wealth than their optimal targets. Our paper differs both in the modeling of
private pensions and in the focus on the retirement wealth distribution. In our model
pensions are conditioned on each households earnings history and private pension cov-
erage is stochastic, whereas in both of these papers pensions only depend on last period
earnings. However, our conclusions share a similar spirit, as we also conclude that the
distribution of retirement wealth in the model is similar to the data.
Most closely related to this project are several recent papers which examine alter-
native explanations for the discrepancies between the life cycle model predictions for
retirement wealth dispersion and the PSID data documented by Hendricks (2007b).
Guner and Knowles (2007) argue that marital instability is important for accounting
for household wealth heterogeneity, since married and never divorced households have
higher wealth levels than divorced or never married households. Yang (2009) explores
the role of the timing of intergenerational bequests, and finds that this can lead to higher
retirement wealth dispersion.
5Cagetti and De Nardi (2008) provide an excellent survey of this literature.
6Several recent papers have examined the differential effects of defined benefit versus define contri-
bution pension plans on household retirement wealth, e.g. see McCarthy (2003)
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents some empiri-
cal findings on retirement wealth. Section 3 outlines the model and the parameterization.
In Section 4 we report the results of our numerical experiments involving private pensions.
Section 5 explores the impact of household heterogeneity in life-cycle earnings profiles
and asset returns on the retirement wealth distribution, while section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence: Retirement Wealth and Life-
time Earnings
The data is drawn from the 1968-2005 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and the PSID supplemental wealth files. We focus on households reporting wealth
when the head is 65 years of age. In order to be in the sample, households retirement
wealth must be observed, nonzero earnings records in 15 survey years (not necessarily
consecutive) must be available, and the households core weight must be positive.
The dollar values are converted into 1994 prices using the Consumer Price Index.
Time trends are removed by dividing by year effects (γt) estimated from regressing
household earnings yit on a quartic in potential experience Xit and year dummies
ln yit = α +Xitβ + ln γt + ²it. (2.1)
To construct lifetime earnings, we use the labor income (net of tax) of the household
head and spouse, which consist of wages, salaries, bonuses, overtime, and the labor part
of business income. The present value of lifetime earnings is the discounted sum of
earnings between ages 18 and 65, where the discount rate is 4 percent.7
We examine two measures of retirement wealth, where by “retirement” we mean the
year when the household head turns 65. The first is the PSID variable Wealth2 (which
we refer to as net worth), which includes financial wealth, private annuities, IRAs, real
estate, business wealth, vehicles, life insurance policies, trusts and other assets less debts.
This measure is available for all of the years we look at (1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2001,
2003, and 2005).8 The second wealth measure we examine adds employer provided
7We replace missing values using their predicted values, which are based on a fixed effect regression
of detrended income for men and women separately on a quartic in experience.
8For households who turn 65 between these year: (i) If we observe wealth before and after they turn
65, we use interpolation to estimate their wealth at 65, or (ii) If we only observe wealth once between
the ages of 63 and 67, we use this as their retirement wealth.
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pensions (both defined contribution plans and defined benefit plans) to Wealth2, and is
available biannually for 1999-2005.
Summary statistics for households for whom we have an estimate of net worth are
reported in Table 1. The majority of the single households in the sample are female.
Overall, the characteristics of this sample are similar to Hendricks (2007b), who looks at
data from the 1968-2003 PSID.9
Table 1: Sample Statistics: 1984 - 2005 PSID
Couples Singles
Mean Std. Mean Std
Number of observations 704 − 464 −
Birth year 1928.7 7.2 1929.6 7.1
Years of school 12.2 3.9 11.8 3.6
Earnings observations 26.5 5.8 27.4 5.6
Earnings at age 40-50 40.0 22.6 25.7 18.1
Lifetime earnings 4194.5 2148.8 2350.6 1405.5
Retirement wealth 390.5 936.1 139.9 318.1
Median retirement wealth 189.0 − 46.7 −
Note: Dollar figures are in thousands of detrended 1994 dollars.
Since private pension data is only reported in the PSID for 1999-2005, we can only
compute pension wealth for households whose head turned 65 between 1997 and 2007.
This reduces the sample by more than half to 455.10 Comparing Table 2 with 1, one
observes that this sub-sample generally resembles the larger sample for whom we have
retirement wealth. As expected, the sub-sample has slightly higher lifetime earnings, as
they were born later than other households in the sample. Their ratio of net worth to
lifetime earnings is also slightly higher, roughly 9.6 % versus 9.3 % for couples and 6.7
% versus 6.0 % for single person households.
As can be seen from Table 2, private pensions account for a significant fraction
of household wealth – nearly a quarter of mean (excluding social security) retirement
wealth. Roughly 51 percent of households have private pensions. Private pension wealth
is even more important for households with pensions, accounting for roughly one-third
9The online appendix reports the sample statistics when we exclude data from the 2005 PSID.
10We dropped one household from the sample who has a very large net worth level (about 16 million
dollars, more than double their lifetime earnings). This matters for the correlation coefficients.
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of retirement wealth. The median values of private pensions are $148,500 and $96,000
for couples with pensions and singles with pensions, respectively.
Table 2: Sample Statistics: 1999 - 2005 PSID
Couples Singles
Mean Std. Mean Std
Number of observations 253 − 202 −
Birth year 1936.2 3.3 1936.4 3.3
Years of school 13.0 3.0 12.0 3.0
Earnings observations 32.8 1.2 32.9 1.2
Earnings at age 40-50 43.4 24.6 26.9 18.6
Lifetime earnings 4582.7 2169.6 2767.5 1437.3
Retirement wealth 441.6 728.4 185.5 430.5
Median retirement wealth 225.6 − 59.2 −
Private pension wealth 143.4 340.9 42.9 90.6
R.W. (incld. Pensions) 585.0 953.7 228.4 446.1
Median R.W. (incld. Pensions) 316.0 − 83.7 −
Note: Dollar figures are in thousands of detrended 1994 dollars.
The distribution of retirement wealth at age 65 is less unequal than the distribution
of wealth across all households. The first row of Table 3 reports the cross sectional
wealth distribution for the 1994 PSID, while the second row reports the distribution of
retirement wealth for our full sample. Comparing the two rows, one sees that the Gini
of net worth at retirement is 0.11 points lower than the Gini for net worth across all
households. This reflects the life-cycle nature of wealth accumulation for retirement,
which leads to increasing levels of wealth as households approach retirement.
Table 3: Wealth Distribution: PSID
Top 1% 1-5% 5-10% 10-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% Gini N
Wealth 1994 22.3 22.9 14.4 16.9 16.3 6.5 1.5 −0.8 0.76 8623
Retirement Wealth 19.3 18.4 13.2 16.0 17.8 9.5 4.7 1.0 0.65 1168
Retir. Wealth (99-05) 14.2 19.2 14.6 19.0 18.8 9.1 4.3 0.8 0.65 455
Pension (99-05) 18.3 26.2 14.2 20.0 19.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.78 455
Retir. incl. Pens. (99-05) 14.6 17.6 14.2 17.6 20.1 10.2 4.6 1.1 0.62 455
Note: N denotes the sample size. Wealth and Retirement wealth refer to net worth (Wealth2).
The last three rows of Table 3 reports the distribution of pension and retirement
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wealth for households whose head age was between 63 and 67 at some point between
1999 and 2005. There are two key points to note. First, comparing the second and third
rows shows that the distribution of net worth for these households is very similar to the
larger sample who reached age 65 between 1982 and 2007. Second, including pensions
tends to equalize the overall distribution of retirement wealth. Comparing the third
and fifth rows of Table 3, including private pensions reduces the Gini by roughly 5%,
from 0.65 to 0.62. This reflects the “evening” effect of pension wealth on the wealth
distribution, as including pension wealth acts to increase the middle 20 - 60 percentiles
share of wealth. The fact that pensions reduce total wealth inequality, despite being
more unequally distributed than net worth, suggests that pension wealth offsets net
worth accumulation.
The overall magnitude of pensions in our sample are slightly lower than estimates
based on the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS).11 Gustman and Steinmeier (1999)
and McGarry and Davenport (1998) use the HRS to examine pension wealth for house-
holds with at least one member aged 51-61 in 1992, which is a nearly identical birth
cohort to ours, albeit observed roughly a decade earlier in life. They find that pension
wealth accounted for roughly a third of mean retirement wealth in the HRS, and that
roughly two-thirds of households had some pension coverage.12 The equalizing effect of
pension wealth on total wealth is also consistent with previous work. Kennickell and
Sunden (1997) and Wolff (2007) use cross-sectional data from the Survey of Consumer
Finance and find that while pensions are more unequally distributed than net worth,
pension wealth has an equalizing effect on the overall wealth distribution.
11The main data sources for pension wealth are the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) and the
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). Compared to the PSID, the SCF provides better coverage of the
wealthiest households (which it over-samples), which is why SCF wealth measures typically have higher
Gini’s. Since the SCF is a cross-sectional survey, it provides limited information on earnings histories.
The HRS is perhaps the most widely used data source for retirement wealth, and has a larger sample
of households with detailed data on the composition of retirement wealth (see Gustman, Steinmeier,
and Tabatabai (2010) for an overview of pension data in the HRS). However, the PSID likely provides
slightly better life-cycle earnings histories, as the HRS primarily makes use of linked data from Social
Security contributions and the PSID income top codes are larger than the Social Security income limits.
12One possible explanation of lower pension coverage rates in our PSID sample is that some of the
IRA accounts included in net worth originated with pension plans that were rolled over.
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2.1 Lifetime Earnings and Retirement Wealth
The joint distribution of retirement wealth and lifetime earnings plays a key role in
assessing how well the predictions of the life-cycle model match the data. We focus on
three dimensions of the joint distribution. The first is the correlation between lifetime
earnings and retirement wealth, which the standard life-cycle model predicts should be
positively related. The second is how (whether?) saving rates vary with income, while the
third is the extent of wealth inequality among households with similar lifetime earnings.
Table 4 reports the correlations between lifetime earnings, net worth (excluding pen-
sions), total retirement wealth (net worth plus private pensions) and private pensions.
The life-cycle model prediction that lifetime earnings and retirement wealth are posi-
tively correlated is borne out in the data (we discuss their quantitative fit in Sections 4
and 5). The correlation between total retirement wealth (net worth plus pension wealth)
and lifetime earnings (0.7) is higher than that of net worth and lifetime earnings (0.64).
Consistent with the higher prevalence of employer pensions among higher paid positions,
private pension wealth is positively correlated with lifetime earnings and net worth.
Table 4 also shows that the correlation between earnings and wealth differs dramati-
cally with income. We divide the sample in half based on lifetime earnings, and look at
the correlations within each group. The correlations for the top half of earners between
earnings and wealth are slightly higher than for the entire sample. However, the relation-
ship is much weaker for the bottom half of earners. This different pattern of correlations
will be useful later in helping to assess where the life-cycle model differs from the data.
Table 4: Correlation Coefficients
Earnings Net Worth Net Worth + Pension Pensions
All Households Earnings 1.00 0.64 0.70 0.65
Net Worth 0.64 1.00 0.95 0.59
Top 50 % Earners Earnings 1.00 0.71 0.73 0.64
Net Worth 0.71 1.00 0.95 0.57
Bot. 50 % Earners Earnings 1.00 0.14 0.17 0.06
Net Worth 0.14 1.00 0.98 0.09
Note: Net worth is retirement wealth excluding private pensions. N = 455.
To examine the relationship between saving rates and lifetime earnings, we sort house-
holds into lifetime earnings deciles. For each decile, the average saving rate is mean re-
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tirement wealth divided by mean lifetime earnings. As can be seen from Figure 1, there
is little difference in mean saving rates for the bottom 80 percent of earners. However,
the top two deciles have higher mean savings rates. This gap in saving rates is slightly
more pronounced than in Hendricks (2007b) (who also looks at the PSID) or Venti and
Wise (2000) (who use the HRS). The inclusion of private pensions leads to higher levels
of savings for all deciles, although the impact of private pensions on the savings rate is
slightly larger for households in the top half of the earnings distribution.
Figure 1: Mean Retirement Wealth/Lifetime Earnings
We follow Venti and Wise (1998) and Hendricks (2007b) and examine the wealth
distribution within lifetime earnings deciles. As Figure 2 illustrates, there is sizeable
retirement wealth inequality even within lifetime earnings deciles. Although pensions
reduce retirement wealth inequality, the effect is not large. The mean Gini of net worth
across lifetime earnings deciles is 0.55, while including pensions in retirement wealth only
reduces this to 0.51. Figure 2 also shows that the gap between the Gini for net worth
and total retirement wealth is primarily due to households in the fourth through seventh
lifetime earnings deciles.
Figure 3 plots the distribution of net worth and total retirement wealth within the 2nd
and 9th lifetime earnings decile. Within each decile, we order households according to
their net worth and plot net worth and total retirement wealth (net worth plus pensions)
for each household. Figure 3 highlights three key points. First, private pensions play
a very small role for low lifetime earners, as very few households have private pensions
(and the value for those with pensions is very small). Second, many (but not all) of
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Figure 2: Gini of Retirement Wealth
the lowest net worth households in the ninth decile have private pensions. This suggests
that pensions help account for why some high lifetime earners have low net worth at
retirement. However, the figure also highlights that some households with relatively
high net worth have large pension wealth as well. Matching this joint distribution of
private pensions and net worth will turn out to be the most significant challenge to the
extended life cycle model that we examine in sections 4 and 5.
2.2 Summary: Key Facts
Overall, we find very similar relationships between retirement wealth and lifetime earn-
ings to those summarized in Hendricks (2007b). Comparing retirement wealth including
and excluding pension wealth, we have the following findings:
1. For all lifetime earnings deciles, the ratio of mean (median) retirement wealth
to lifetime earnings increases if retirement wealth includes pension. The ratio
increases about two percentage points on average within lifetime earnings deciles.
2. Including private pensions leads to a decline in wealth inequality. The Gini coeffi-
cient drops from 0.65 to 0.62 when the wealth measure includes private pensions.
3. While there is sizeable retirement wealth (with and without pension) inequality
among households with similar lifetime earnings, including private pensions lowers
the Gini coefficient in each lifetime earnings decile. The average Gini coefficient
12
Figure 3: Retirement Wealth Distribution: 2nd and 9th decile
Note: Households are ordered within each decile according to net worth.
within lifetime earnings deciles is 0.55 for wealth excluding private pensions, and
0.51 for wealth including private pensions.
4. The correlations between lifetime earnings and total retirement wealth is slightly
larger than that between earnings and net worth. However, the correlation between
earnings and net worth is very small for the bottom half of lifetime earners.
3 Model
We consider a discrete time life cycle model where households live for J periods and max-
imize their life-time discounted utility from consumption. Households face idiosyncratic
shocks to labor earnings, mortality, inheritance, and private pension coverage.
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3.1 Preferences
Households preferences are represented by
J∑
j=1
βj−1Πjt=0Pt
c1−σj
1− σ (3.1)
where β < 1 is the discount factor, Pt denotes the probability that the household is alive
in period t conditional on being alive in period t− 1, σ is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, and cj denotes consumption in period j. As in Hendricks (2007b), we assume
households do not receive utility from leaving bequests.
3.2 Labor Income Process
Households work in the first R < J periods. After R, households are retired and receive
their retirement income. J and R are assumed to be exogenous and deterministic.
In each working period 1 ≤ j ≤ R, labor earnings are determined by a deterministic
age profile, hj, and by a persistent productivity, e:
yj = ehj (3.2)
The evolution of e for household i is governed by an AR(1) process:
ei,j+1 = ρei,j + εi,j+1 (3.3)
where ε are independent and identically normally distributed N(0, σ2ε) .
When j > R, the household is retired and no longer receives earnings. Instead,
they receive transfer income from Social Security and private pensions. Social Security
benefits depend on average earnings, y¯, over the last 35 years of working life. Private
pension benefits are based upon average earnings and the number of years of coverage.
The evolution of household private pension coverage is stochastic, and governed by a
transition matrix. More details on transfer income are provided in section 3.4.
3.3 Household Problem
The state variables for the household are: age j, financial wealth k, earnings state e,
average earnings over past periods y¯, private pension status in the current period pen,
and years of pension coverage until current period ndb. Each period, households choose
14
consumption and saving after the realization of uncertainty. The Bellman equation for
a household of age j is:
Vj[k, e, y¯, pen, ndb] = max
c
{
c1−σ
1− σ + βPj+1E[Vj+1(k
′, e′, y¯′, pen′, n′db]
}
(3.4)
subject to the budget constraint
k′ = (1 + r)k + y + I + τ + db− c (3.5)
where r is the interest rate, I is a random inheritance which is governed by a probability
distribution, τ is Social Security benefits, and db is private pension benefits. We assume
that borrowing is not allowed in the model (we relax this assumption in section 4.4.2).
3.4 Model Parameterization
In this section, we outline our benchmark parameterization. Given our interest in com-
paring our results to the literature, our choice of parameter values closely follows Hen-
dricks (2007b).
Table 5 lists the benchmark parameter values. Households enter the model at age
20, work until age 64 before retiring and live to a maximum age of 95. We use female
mortality rates from the Period Life Table 1990 of the Social Security Administration,
and assume that the probability of dying before age 52 is zero. We follow Hendricks
(2007b) and set the coefficient of relative risk aversion σ to 1.5, and the annual discount
factor β to 0.958.
3.4.1 Labor Income
The experience profile (Xijβ) from equation 2.1 is used as the age earnings profile in
the model. Since the regression uses only strictly positively earnings observations, the
implied age earnings profile is multiplied by the fraction of households with strictly
positive earnings observed at each age. The resulting profile is shown in Figure 4.
The remaining parameters of the labor income process are ρ and σε. New households
draw their first labor endowment from a Normal distribution with mean zero and stan-
dard deviation σe1. The values of ρ, σε, and σe1 are taken from Hendricks (2007b).
13 The
AR(1) process is discretized as a seven-state Markov process using the Tauchen method.
The distribution of lifetime earnings is reported in Table 6. The model does a rea-
sonably good job of replicating the distribution of lifetime earnings.
13These values are also used in Huggett (1996).
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Table 5: Model Parameters
Demographics
J = 76 Maximum lifespan (physical age 95)
R = 45 Last working period (physical age 64)
Pj Survival probabilities
Preferences
β = 0.958 Discount factor
σ = 1.50 Risk aversion
Labor income
ρ = 0.96 Persistence of e
σε = 0.21 Standard deviation of e shocks
σe1 = 0.62 Standard deviation of e1
e = (0.08, 0.19, 0.44, 1.00, 2.27, 5.18, 11.77) Labor income state
Inheritances
j = 33 Age of inheritance (physical age 52)
PI = (0.50, 0.30, 0.10, 0.08, 0.02) Probabilities of inheritance
I = (0.0, 1.6, 4.3, 15.9, 58.0) Inheritance amounts
multiples of mean earnings per household
Private pensions
θ(e) = (0.00, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.60, 0.80) Pension coverage at j = 1
α(ndb) Generosity factor. See text
Other parameters
r = 0.04 Interest rate
3.4.2 Initial Wealth and Inheritance
The distribution of initial wealth (capital endowment) for new households is estimated
from the PSID wealth files.14 The sample consists of households with heads aged 19-21
in all years. Since there is no lending technology in the model, young households with
negative net worth are assigned to zero initial wealth.
Hendricks (2007b) estimates the size distribution of lifetime inheritance, discounted to
age 52, which is the mean age of inheritance in the PSID. The distribution of inheritance
is approximated on a five-point grid. The probabilities (PI) and inheritance levels (I)
are reported in Table 5. Following Hendricks (2007b), inheritances are received at age 52
(model period 33) in the model. We assume that households have no information about
future inheritances and inheritances are not correlated with earnings.
14Assuming that all households start with zero initial wealth has little effects on our findings.
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Figure 4: Lifetime Earnings Profile
Table 6: Distribution of Lifetime Earnings
Top 1% 1-5% 5-10% 10-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% Gini
PSID 3.9 9.2 9.0 15.2 24.2 18.6 13.2 6.7 0.31
Model 5.2 12.4 10.6 16.0 23.1 15.3 11.2 6.1 0.37
Note: The table shows the Lorenz curve of lifetime earnings.
3.4.3 Social Security Benefits
Households receive transfers from a social security system during retirement. We assume
that the benefits depend on average earnings, y¯, computed over the last 35 years of
working life. In each year, the contribution of current earnings to y¯ is capped at y¯max =
2.47y˜, where y˜ is mean earnings of all working age households. Social security benefits
are a piecewise linear function of average earnings:
τ(y¯) = 0.9min(y¯, y¯1) + 0.32max(0,min(y¯, y¯2)− y¯1) + 0.15max(0, y¯ − y¯2) (3.6)
where y¯1 = 0.2y˜ and y¯2 = 1.24y˜ are the bend points.
3.4.4 Private Pension
There are two types of (employer sponsored) private pension plans in the U.S.: defined
benefit (DB) pension plans and defined contribution (DC) pension plans. In traditional
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DB plans, employees receive regular retirement payments for as long as they live, which
are generally determined by a formula based on earnings history and years of cover-
age. DB plans are managed by employers, and employees typically do not make active
decisions. In contrast, participation in DC plans (such as a 401(k)) often requires ac-
tive decisions by eligible employees about how much to contribute (subject to plan and
legislative limits), and how to invest their money. Employers often provide matching
contributions (up to a pre-determined limit) for employee contributions.
We model pensions as DB plans since roughly 80% of the present value of private
pensions for our PSID sample are defined benefits. Pension benefits, db, are given by
db = α(ndb)ndby¯p (3.7)
where y¯p is the average earnings over last 35 years of working life, ndb denotes years of
pension coverage, and α(ndb) is the generosity factor, which represents the fraction of
average earnings each year of coverage adds to pension benefits.15 We call α(ndb)ndb the
replacement rate of average earnings.
We calibrate the pension system to match the life cycle profile of pension coverage
and the distribution of replacement rates. Pension coverage for new households is set
to 20%, which is the pension coverage rate for households with heads aged below 25 in
the 2004 SCF. To match the positive correlation between household income and pension
coverage, we assign higher probabilities of pension coverage to higher income groups at
age 20 (see Table 5).
The pension transition matrix is asymmetric. This generates a life-cycle profile of
pension coverage and pension accumulation. Households with pension coverage at pe-
riod t face a probability of 91 percent of continuing to have coverage at t + 1, and a
complementary probability of 9 percent of losing coverage. Households without coverage
in period t have a 3 percent probability of transiting to coverage at t+1 and a 97 percent
probability of remaining uncovered in the following period.
We approximate α(ndb) with a step function. This allows us to capture two key
features of DB pensions. First, many DB plans have a minimum service requirement
before the pension benefits become vested (see Foster (1997) and Mitchell (2003)). Here
we assume a vesting period of 7 years. Second, many DB benefit plans base the pension
payout on a combination of years of service and average salary over the last few years of
service. The step function captures this by increasing the weighting with years of service.
15Pension benefits for some DB plans are based on earnings history, while others are based on terminal
earnings. Here we assume that pension benefits depend on earnings history.
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α =

0 if ndb ≤ 7
1.25 if ndb ∈ [8, 10]
1.62 if ndb ∈ [11, 20]
2.50 if ndb ∈ [21, 35]
2.50 35
ndb
if ndb ∈ [36, 45]
(3.8)
The benchmark parameterization closely matches the PSID data. PSID pension
coverage rate (for our sample for which we have estimates of private pension wealth
at retirement) is 51 %, while the model generates a coverage rate of 53 %. Table 7
compares the distribution of replacement rates for pension holders in the model with the
PSID data.16 The model closely replicates the replacement rate distribution.
Table 7: Distribution of Replacement Rate
PSID Model
Replacement Range Fraction Mean Replacement Fraction Mean Replacement
< 20% 38% 9.25% 35% 11.5%
[20%, 60%] 43% 38.11% 44% 33.5%
> 60% 19% 75.21% 20% 75.6%
All 100 34% 100 34%
Our calibration strategy does not directly target the distribution of pension wealth
at retirement. As can be seen from Table 8, with the exception of the top 1%, the model
does a good job of replicating the pension wealth distribution.
Table 8: Distribution of Pension Wealth
Top 1% 1-5% 5-10% 10-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% Gini
PSID 18.3 26.2 14.2 20.0 19.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.78
Model 7.8 22.8 19.1 22.6 22.2 5.4 0.0 0.0 0.72
16Our replacement rates are for households with a pension with: (1) a head aged 60-69 in the 2005
PSID; (2) at least 20 years of nonzero earnings for the head in 1968-2005; and (3) non-immigrant.
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4 Private Pensions and Retirement Wealth
In this section, we examine the impact of private pensions on the distribution of retire-
ment wealth in our benchmark economy. There are three key findings. First, net worth
at retirement is more unequally distributed in the model economy with private pensions.
This moves the model predictions for the retirement wealth distribution closer to the
data. As a result, we can partially account for the discrepancies between the life-cycle
model predictions and the data emphasized by Hendricks (2007b). The second finding is
negative: the pension offset effect on net worth is larger in the model than in the data.
This causes the model to “miss” the joint distribution of pension and non-pension wealth,
which results in too little inequality in total retirement wealth compared to the data.
Finally, while significant, the quantitative impact of private pensions on the retirement
wealth distribution is much smaller than that of Social Security.
4.1 Private Pensions and the Retirement Wealth Distribution
Table 9 reports key moments of the Lorenz curve for retirement wealth in the model
economy and the PSID. There are two key points to take away from Table 9. First, private
pensions lead to higher inequality in net worth at retirement. The Gini of retirement
net worth is 0.56 in the economy without private pensions, while the Gini in the private
pension economy is 0.62. This increased level of wealth inequality moves the predictions
of the model closer to the data, as the Gini in the PSID is 0.65. Second, Table 9
highlights a key discrepancy between the private pension economy and the data: the
joint distribution of pension and non-pension wealth. This results in too large a gap
between the Gini of total retirement wealth (including pensions) and net worth in the
model, 0.08 (0.62 - 0.54), relative to the data where the gap is only 0.03 (0.65 - 0.62).
Table 9: Retirement Wealth Distribution at 65
Wealth Top 1% 1-5% 5-10% 10-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% Gini
Model: No Pens. R.W. 8.3 17.7 14.6 18.0 21.8 11.5 6.2 1.8 0.56
Model: Pens. R.W. 9.8 19.9 15.9 18.7 20.7 9.9 4.4 0.7 0.62
Model: Pens. R.W.+ Pens. 8.1 17.1 14.3 17.8 21.8 12.1 6.6 2.3 0.54
PSID (99-05) R.W. 14.2 19.2 14.6 19.0 18.8 9.1 4.3 0.8 0.65
PSID (99-05) R.W.+. Pens. 14.6 17.6 14.2 17.6 20.1 10.2 4.6 1.1 0.62
Note: The table reports the Lorenz curve of retirement wealth.
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The key model mechanism linking private pensions to net worth is the offset effect.
Private pensions offset (lower) non-pension wealth for two reasons. First, since a private
pension provides post-retirement income, intertemporal smoothing of consumption leads
households with a pension to consume more in earlier periods than an otherwise identi-
cal household without a pension. Second, private pensions provide longevity insurance,
which reduces the need for households with large pensions to hold precautionary wealth
to self-insure against longevity risk.17 Working in the opposite direction are two forces
that lower offset. First, the risk of losing pension coverage, combined with a pension
replacement rate that rises steeply with additional years of coverage, creates a precau-
tionary motive for non-pension retirement saving. Second, the combination of social
security and no-borrowing may lead to some households who would have saved less than
the value of the private pension being “forced” to over-accumulate retirement assets.
If all households had private pensions and the same offset rate, private pensions
would have little impact on the distribution of net worth (but would impact the level).
However, private pension coverage in the model (and the data) is incomplete, as only
half of households have a private pension at retirement. This partial coverage, combined
with different offset effects across households, is why net worth inequality is higher in
the private pension economy.
While the model net worth distribution closely resembles the data, the model gen-
erates too little inequality in total retirement wealth. From Table 9, this appears to be
largely due to higher displacement of non-pension retirement savings of higher income
households in the model than in the data. To better understand this pension offset ef-
fect, we sort households into deciles based on the present value of lifetime earnings, and
compute the mean saving rate for households with and without pensions. The saving
rate is total retirement wealth divided by total lifetime earnings, where total retirement
wealth is the present value of pension benefits at 65 plus net worth. To control for the
higher income associated with employer pension contributions, we define total lifetime
earnings as lifetime earnings plus the present value of pension benefits at 65.18
We find that the level of pension offset varies across lifetime earnings deciles. For all
17We assume that there are no private annuity markets which provide insurance against the risk
created by stochastic death in the model. While some private annuity markets do exist, they account
for a small share of retirement wealth (see Poterba (2006) and Johnson, Burman, and Kobes (2004)).
18An employer provided pension is a form of (deferred) labour compensation. Hence, we add the
present value of employer contributions to life-time earnings so as to have a consistent measure of total
labour compensation for households with and without an employer provided pension.
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deciles, the ratio of net worth to lifetime earnings is lower for households with private pen-
sions than for households without pensions. However, the displacement of non-pension
wealth is larger for high income households. For the bottom half of lifetime earners,
households with private pensions have slightly higher saving rates than households with-
out private pensions. Private pension coverage has little impact on the average saving
rates for households in the upper middle part of the lifetime earnings distribution (deciles
6 to 8). However, for the top two deciles, private pensions coverage leads to a decline
in the average saving rate. This reflects the fact that the highest lifetime earners have
the smallest replacement rate from social security. As a result, the longevity insurance
provided by private pensions leads to a reduction in precautionary savings.
This offset pattern qualitatively resembles the PSID data.19 However, pensions dis-
place less wealth for the highest lifetime earners in the PSID than in the model. For the
highest three lifetime earnings deciles, the ratio of net worth to lifetime earning is higher
for households with pensions than without pensions. This is a key reason why the joint
distribution of net worth and pension wealth in the model differs from the data.
A similar pattern appears when we examine the correlation between lifetime earnings
and retirement wealth (see Table 10). The model understates the correlation between
pension wealth and net worth, as the model correlation is 0.19 versus 0.59 in the PSID.
Together with the (too) large pension offset effect in the model, this leads to a lower
correlation between pensions and total retirement wealth in the model (0.45) than in the
data (0.80). The economy with private pensions also generates too tight a relationship
between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings. While the correlation between lifetime
earnings and net worth is lower in the pension economy (0.80) than in the standard life-
cycle model (0.85), it is well above the 0.64 observed in the PSID. However, the model
does generate much higher correlations between wealth and earnings for the top half
than the bottom half of lifetime earners. Comparing the correlations between lifetime
earnings and net worth within the top and bottom half of earners, one observes a closer
fit between the model and the data. Overall, while private pensions reduce the correla-
tion between earnings and net worth, they can only partially account for the Hendricks
(2007b) correlation puzzle.
19This pattern is consistent with recent works that finds that 401k plans have a large offset effect on
saving by high income households but increase saving rates for lower income households (Chernozhukov
and Hansen (2004)).
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Table 10: Correlation Coefficients in Private Pension Economy
Earnings Net Worth Net Worth + Pension Pensions
All Households Earnings 1.00 0.80 0.85 0.48
Net Worth 0.80 1.00 0.96 0.19
Top 50 % Earners Earnings 1.00 0.80 0.84 0.25
Net Worth 0.80 1.00 0.96 0.00
Bot. 50 % Earners Earnings 1.00 0.19 0.27 0.43
Net Worth 0.19 1.00 0.93 -0.02
4.2 Within Decile Wealth Distribution
The private pension economy features higher dispersion in net worth among households
with similar lifetime earnings than the economy without private pensions. Figure 5 plots
the Gini coefficient for each lifetime earning decile for retirement net worth in the model
economies, as well as the PSID. As in Hendricks (2007b), we find that the life-cycle
model (without pensions) roughly matches the slope of the Gini across lifetime earnings
deciles, but generates too little within decile wealth dispersion. As Figure 5 illustrates,
within decile wealth inequality in the private pension economy is closer to the data, with
a mean (across deciles) Gini of 0.49 compared to 0.39 in the economy without pensions.
Figure 5: Gini Coefficient of Retirement Wealth (Net Worth)
To understand why the private pension economy generates higher wealth inequality,
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we examine the wealth distribution within each decile. For illustrative purposes, we focus
on the second and ninth lifetime earnings deciles. As Figure 6 illustrates, the standard
life-cycle model (without pensions) misses different regions of the PSID distribution for
low lifetime earners than for high lifetime earners. For the second earnings decile, the
model without private pensions does a very good job of matching the bottom 80 percent
of the wealth distribution, but (even with inheritances) understates the wealth of the
wealthiest 5 percent. In contrast, the model significantly over predicts the savings of the
bottom 60 percent of the wealth distribution of the ninth lifetime earnings decile.
As Figure 6 highlights, private pensions mainly increase non-pension wealth inequal-
ity via a decline in the holdings of the wealth poorest in each lifetime earnings decile.
The quantitative decline in wealth (and the increase in the Gini) is smaller for the sec-
ond lifetime earnings decile than the ninth for two reasons. First, lower lifetime earnings
households are less likely to receive private pensions. Second, the high replacement rate
of social security for low income households leads to low savings rates, so there is little
scope for pensions to offset non-pension savings. In contrast, the higher prevalence of
private pensions among higher income workers leads to the displacement of non-pension
retirement savings for a number of households with private pensions.
The private pension model significantly understates total retirement wealth inequal-
ity between households with similar lifetime earnings. Comparing the within decile of
total retirement savings (pension plus non-pension wealth), one finds that the model
generates an average Gini across deciles of 0.37, versus 0.51 in the PSID sample. The
difference, of 0.14, is only slightly smaller than the gap of 0.16 between the model without
private pensions and the data.20 This is another result of differences between the joint
distribution of pension and non-pension retirement wealth in the model and the data. In
particular, there are two main discrepancies between the data and the model predictions.
First, a number of high lifetime earners with low net worth in the data lack pensions,
while in the model almost all of these households have private pensions. Second, some
relatively high net worth households in the data have large pensions – which results in
the richest households holding more wealth than predicted by the model.21
This leads us to the following conclusion. On the one hand, the private pension econ-
omy can largely account for the dispersion of net worth at retirement between households
20See the online appendix for the plot of the Gini by earning decile.
21One possible explanation of this difference is that some state workers do not have access to social
security, whereas all workers in the model receive social security.
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Figure 6: Non-pension Retirement Wealth: 2nd and 9th Lifetime Earnings
Deciles
with similar lifetime earnings. However, the model succeeds in this by generating too
much displacement of non-pension savings for households with private pensions. This
suggests that pensions play a key role in evaluating why the life-cycle model cannot fully
account for wealth inequality between households with similar lifetime earnings.
4.3 Comparing Social Security and Private Pensions
While most quantitative life cycle models incorporate social security, private pensions
are rarely explicitly modeled.22 This is somewhat surprising, as mean pension wealth
22The large effects of social security on the U.S. wealth distribution are well known, see for example
Huggett (1996) and Huggett and Ventura (2000).
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is significant, roughly 70 % of mean social security wealth (Gustman, Steinmeier, and
Tabatabai (2010)), and is a large component of mean non-social security retirement
wealth (see Table 2).23
To examine the relative quantitative impact of social security and private pensions on
the distribution of retirement wealth, we simulate the benchmark economy without social
security.24 This leads us to two key conclusions. First, private pensions have a much
smaller impact on the wealth distribution in the model than social security. Second, even
when private pensions are included, social security still boosts the saving rates of higher
income relative to lower income households.
Table 11 reports the retirement wealth distribution without social security for the
benchmark economy with and without private pensions. Comparing the first three rows
of Table 11 with their counterparts in Table 9 illustrates the large effect of social security
on the distribution of private retirement wealth. In the benchmark economy, the removal
of Social Security lowers the Gini of retirement wealth by over 20 % (i.e, in the economy
without private pensions the Gini falls from 0.56 to 0.43). The effect of Social Security
on wealth inequality is roughly twice as large as that of private pensions, which increase
wealth inequality by roughly 10 % (from a Gini of 0.43 to 0.48 in the model without
social security, and from 0.56 to 0.62 with social security).
The larger impact of social security on private retirement wealth inequality reflects
two factors. First, the average expected present value of social security in the benchmark
economy is roughly 1.8 times the value of private pensions. Secondly, the distribution
of social security across households differs significantly from private pensions, as social
security covers all households while only half of households receive a private pension.
Moreover, private pensions are concentrated among middle and upper earners, while
social security covers all workers and provides much higher replacement rates of pre-
retirement incomes for lower earnings deciles. As a result, Social Security has a larger
effect on the saving of lower income than higher income households. This leads to a large
decrease in the share of net worth held by the bottom half of the wealth distribution.
These experiments also shed light on the debate over whether life-cycle models can
23The average expected value of social security payments is roughly three-quarters as large as average
net worth for near retirement households in the U.S. Social security is even more important for the me-
dian household, as the expected value of social security payments exceeds median net worth (Gustman,
Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2010)).
24When we shut down social security, we scale households labour endowments by 11−12.4% , where
12.4% is the payroll tax for the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program.
26
Table 11: Retirement Wealth Distribution at 65 (No Social Security)
Wealth Top 1% 1-5% 5-10% 10-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% Gini
Model: No-pens. R.W. 5.9 13.5 11.8 16.7 23.3 14.5 9.7 4.7 0.43
Model: Pens. R.W. 6.6 14.8 12.6 17.6 22.7 13.8 8.4 3.4 0.48
Model: Pens. R.W.+ Pens. 5.9 13.5 11.9 16.8 23.2 14.4 9.6 4.6 0.43
account for the higher saving rate of high lifetime earners. Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes
(2004) argue that social security is an implausible explanation for why households with
higher lifetime earnings have higher savings rates. In our benchmark economy with social
security and private pension, we find that the ratio of mean lifetime retirement savings
(including pensions) to mean lifetime earnings increases by nearly 40 % moving from the
eighth to the tenth earnings deciles. This is nearly half of the increase observed in the
PSID data (see Figure 1). This increase is driven mainly by the low replacement rate
of social security. By comparison, in the economy without social security, private saving
rates increase by only half as much (roughly 20 %). This suggests, as argued by Huggett
and Ventura (2000), that social security may play a significant role in explaining the
higher saving rates of high earners.25
4.4 Robustness: Bequest Motive and Borrowing
In this section, we briefly discuss robustness with respect to the simplifying assumptions
of no bequest motive and no borrowing. These assumptions are potentially important
since they impact households’ consumption and saving behavior, and hence could poten-
tially change our findings. We find that relaxing these assumptions is not quantitatively
important for our main results.26
25There is some debate over how much higher the saving rate of households with high lifetime labour
earnings is. Similar to Hendricks (2007b) and Venti and Wise (1998), we find that savings rates are
relatively flat across earnings deciles, increasing only modestly for the highest quintile of lifetime earners.
Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) – who use proxies for permanent household income – find much larger
increases in savings rates with household income.
26More detailed discussion of these experiments are reported in the online appendix.
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4.4.1 Bequest Motive
To investigate the effect of a bequest motive, we follow De Nardi (2004) and introduce a
“warm glow” type of voluntary bequest motive. Households derive utility from leaving
bequests, and may receive at most one inheritance between ages 40-60. The probability
of receiving an inheritance, which is now endogenous, depends on the mortality risk and
wealth of households aged 65-85.
Adding a bequest motive does not significantly increase wealth inequality. In the
model without private pensions, introducing bequests increases the Gini from 0.56 to
0.57, while in the pension economy the Gini decreases from 0.62 to 0.61. The small im-
pact of the bequest motive is likely due to two factors. First, we maintain the assumption
that households only know the distribution of future inheritances.27 Second, the bequest
motive has a small effect on the amount of retirement wealth for most households, al-
though it has a large impact on dissaving for retirees (as in De Nardi (2004)).
4.4.2 Borrowing
To examine the impact of the no borrowing restriction, we run an experiment where
households can borrow up to one year of mean earnings, which must be repaid by age 51
(since mortality risk begins at age 52). The borrowing rate is set at the rate of return
plus 4%. We find that this has little impact on our results.
5 Can Heterogeneity and Private Pensions Account
for the Dispersion of Retirement Wealth
While private pensions reduce the gap between the life cycle model and the data, a sig-
nificant fraction of retirement wealth inequality between households with similar lifetime
earnings remains unaccounted for in the experiments in Section 4. This leads us to ask
whether private pensions combined with rate of return heterogeneity and earnings profile
heterogeneity, can account for the discrepancy between data and theory.
The motivation for introducing these channels is twofold. First, both returns and
earning profiles influence households savings decisions over the life-cycle. Second, there is
empirical evidence that both return and profile heterogeneity exist, as Hendricks (2007b)
27Assuming that households can observe their parents’ productivity and wealth level would make
solving the model computationally more difficult as two more state variables would be required.
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finds differences in the average rate of return on saving across households in the PSID,
while differences in earnings profiles across education groups are well established.
We find that the life cycle model augmented to include private pensions, return and
profile heterogeneity can largely account for the dispersion of retirement wealth:
1. The model closely matches the Gini for both non-pension retirement wealth ( 0.67
versus 0.65 in the data) and total retirement wealth (0.60 versus 0.62 in the data)
2. The Gini of retirement net worth within lifetime earnings deciles is close to the
data: with a cross-decile mean of 0.47 versus 0.51 in the PSID.
3. The correlation between earnings and retirement net worth is reduced to 0.72,
versus 0.64 in the data. The correlations within the top and bottom half of lifetime
earners are even closer to the data, as the correlation between net worth and lifetime
earners for the top half (bottom) of earners is 0.72 (0.18) in the model versus 0.71
(0.14) in the PSID.
These positive results are tempered by a discrepancy between the model predictions
and the data for households with pensions. The model generates a larger pension offset
effect than observed in the data. As a result, mean savings rates for households with
pensions in the PSID are higher than predicted by the model. This leads to higher net
worth dispersion for households with pensions than in the data.
Overall, our interpretation of these results leads us to conclude that the life-cycle
model can largely account for the large differences in retirement wealth observed in the
U.S. Indeed, if anything our results suggest that the life-cycle model generates too much,
not too little, inequality in retirement net worth.
5.1 Paremertization: Earnings Profile and Rate of Return
We follow Hendricks (2007b) and introduce a simple form of rate of return hetero-
geneity. Specifically, we assume that each household i draws a rate of return ri on
savings at birth. Hendricks (2007b) uses PSID wealth data to calibrate a return pro-
cess with four types, r ∈ {0.0023, 0.0316, 0.0485, 0.0872} with associated probabilities
Pq = (0.15, 0.35, 0.40, 0.10).
Profile heterogeneity is introduced by extending the model to include three education
types: no high school, high school and college. We use our PSID sample to calibrate the
fraction of each type. This yields 34% of households without a high school education,
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43% whose highest level of schooling is high school, and 23% with a college degree.28
We use the age-profiles reported in Table 2 of Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005). We
keep all other features in the model unchanged.
5.2 Results
The life-cycle model, augmented to include earnings profile and return heterogeneity,
closely matches the PSID retirement wealth distribution. Table 12 reports the retirement
wealth distribution for the augmented model with profile and return heterogeneities.
The extended life-cycle model slightly over predicts the degree of inequality in non-
pension retirement wealth, and slightly under predicts total retirement wealth inequality.
However, the difference between the Gini of net worth and total retirement wealth is
reduced by nearly half, to 0.05 (0.67 - 0.62), compared to the benchmark economy.
Table 12: Wealth at 65: Augmented Model
Wealth Top 1% 1-5% 5-10% 10-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% Gini
Model: No-pens. R.W. 10.5 19.8 15.5 19.2 20.1 9.8 4.3 0.9 0.62
Model: Pens. R.W. 11.9 21.7 16.4 19.3 19.3 8.2 2.9 0.2 0.67
Model: Pens. R.W.+ Pens. 10.0 18.9 14.9 18.7 20.2 10.6 5.2 1.5 0.60
The extended model lowers the correlations between lifetime earnings and retirement
wealth. The correlation between lifetime earnings and net worth in the extended model
is reduced to 0.72 (from 0.85 in the “standard” life-cycle model), versus 0.64 in the data,
while the correlation between lifetime earnings and total retirement wealth is 0.77 versus
0.70 in the data.29 The reduction in the model correlation of 0.13 (0.85 - 0.72) is driven
roughly equally by private pensions, which lowers the correlation by 0.05, and profile
and return heterogeneity, each of which lowers the correlation by roughly 0.04.
The model matches the earnings-wealth correlation within the top and bottom half
of lifetime earners even more closely. Looking at the top 50 percent of lifetime earners,
the correlation of earnings with net worth is 0.72 (model) versus 0.71 (data), while
the earnings-total retirement correlation is 0.77 (model) versus 0.73 (data). The model
generates slightly higher correlations for the bottom half of lifetime earners, 0.18 versus
0.14 for net worth, and 0.24 versus 0.17 for net worth plus pensions.
28The cutoffs for grade of school are: < 12, 12-14, and ≥ 15.
29The correlation between lifetime earnings and pension wealth is now 0.54, versus 0.65 in the data.
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Given the similarity of the model and data correlations within the top half of lifetime
earners, it is not surprising that the model and data correlation between lifetime earnings
and retirement net worth (total retirement wealth) for households with pensions are
very close: 0.74 (0.78) in our PSID sample and 0.71 (0.78) in the model. However, the
augmented model generates too high a correlation between lifetime earnings and net
worth for households without pensions: 0.75 versus 0.46 in the PSID. Interestingly, the
gap between the model and the data is also large within the top half of lifetime earners,
where the model correlation is 0.73 versus 0.56 in the data.
The augmented model largely accounts for the substantial wealth inequality within
lifetime earning deciles. Examining Figure 7, one observes that the model now accounts
for the dispersion of total retirement wealth for all but the second and the tenth deciles
of lifetime earners. The mean Gini of total retirement wealth across lifetime earnings
decile is 0.47 (versus 0.37 in the benchmark economy with private pensions), which is
close to the 0.51 observed in the data. As with the economy wide retirement net worth
distribution, the pension economy slightly over-predicts the dispersion of non-pension
wealth within lifetime earnings deciles. In the model with private pensions, the mean
Gini of non-pension retirement wealth across lifetime earnings decile is 0.58, versus 0.55
in the PSID. Private pensions play a key role in increasing net worth inequality, as when
we shut down private pensions the mean Gini declines to 0.51.
To better understand wealth inequality within earning deciles, we again examine the
distribution of retirement wealth within the second and ninth lifetime earnings deciles.
Figure 8 plots the distribution of net worth and total private retirement wealth in the
second and ninth lifetime earnings deciles. In the ninth earnings decile, the model now
accounts for the sizable number of households with high life-time earnings who have low
net worth and low private pensions wealth. For non-pension wealth the model generates
slightly lower wealth holdings for the wealth poorer half of the ninth deciles. Indeed, the
main difference between the model and the data is now that the model under predicts
wealth for most of the bottom half of the distribution.
The extended model helps to deal with the main problem in the second lifetime
earnings decile, which was an insufficient number of earnings poor households with large
retirement wealth. As Figure 8 (panels a and b) show, the augmented model increases the
wealth level of the richest households in the low income group while having little impact
on the savings of most low lifetime earners. This is mainly driven by return heterogeneity,
which leads to some households receiving high returns on inherited wealth.
31
Figure 7: Gini Coefficient of Retirement Wealth
5.2.1 Pension Offset Effect: Too Large in the Model?
While the augmented model reduces the gap between the model and the data, it does not
fully match the joint distribution of pension and non-pension wealth. As in section 4,
the average saving rate of households with and without pensions suggests that the model
pension offset effect is too large. Unlike the pension economy without profile or return
heterogeneity, however, the augmented model is now qualitatively consistent with the
PSID in that the average saving rates for all but the lowest quintile of lifetime earners
with pensions exceeds those without pensions. However, the model saving rate for the
highest decile of lifetime earners with pensions is much lower than in the PSID (roughly
11 % versus 18 %). Interestingly, the model saving rates for households without pensions
is fairly close to the data.
To better understand the pension offset effect, we follow Gustman and Steinmeier
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Figure 8: Retirement Wealth Distribution: 2nd and 9th Lifetime Earnings
Deciles
(1999) and estimate simple OLS regressions of wealth on lifetime earnings and pension
status on the simulated data as well as the PSID. Our PSID estimates are similar to
Gustman and Steinmeier (1999), who examined data from the HRS, and imply a pension
offset effect of roughly 50 percent. However, the OLS estimate of the offset effect in the
model is much larger, roughly 75 percent. When we estimate the regression on the top
and bottom half of earners, we find that the offset effect is 76 percent and 61 percent,
respectively. Overall, the saving data suggest that the main discrepancy between the
model and the data is much higher pension offset rates for high lifetime earners with
large pensions in the model.30
30There is debate over the magnitude of the pension offset effect in the data. This issue plays a key
role in the debate over whether pensions and retirement tax incentives increase net retirement saving
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5.2.2 Decomposing Profile and Return Heterogeneity
To understand the contribution of earnings profile and rate of return heterogeneity to
higher levels of wealth inequality, we consider each type of heterogeneity individually.31
The effects of earnings profile and rate of return heterogeneity individually are very sim-
ilar. In the presence of private pensions, earning profile (return) heterogeneity increases
the Gini of non-pension retirement wealth to 0.66 (0.65) from 0.62, and the Gini of total
retirement wealth to 0.58 (0.57) from 0.54 (see Table 9). When both earnings profile and
rate of return heterogeneity are combined, wealth inequality is smaller than the sum of
the two individually. However, the combination leads to a decrease in the gap between
non-pension and total retirement wealth inequality. This highlights the importance of
explicitly modeling different types of heterogeneity simultaneously.
5.2.3 Life-cycle Wealth Inequality
Within cohort wealth inequality varies significantly over the life-cycle, initially declining
between the ages of 20 to 45, and then remains roughly constant until households hit
retirement age (Hendricks (2007a) and Budria, Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull
(2002)). As can be seen from Figure 9, both our benchmark and augmented versions
of the life-cycle model are qualitatively consistent with this pattern. However, wealth
inequality declines much more in the benchmark version of the life-cycle model than
when we incorporate private pensions, earning profile and return heterogeneity.
This quantitative difference is interesting, since Hendricks (2007a) finds that wealth
inequality declines less in the data than in the standard life-cycle model. Using the
PSID, Hendricks (2007a) finds that the Gini of net worth declines from roughly 0.87 at
age 25 to 0.65 at age 60, with most of the decline occurring before age 45.32 Similar
to Hendricks (2007a), our benchmark economy without pensions generates too large a
decline in wealth inequality, so that for ages 30 and up the Gini coefficients are roughly
0.1 smaller than in the data. In contrast, the life-cycle model augmented to include
private pensions, earning profile and return heterogeneity predicts a decline in inequality
similar to the PSID age-Gini profile. The Gini coefficient at age 60 is about 0.65 in the
data, it is 0.65 and 0.62 in the augmented model with and without pensions respectively,
while it is 0.55 in the benchmark without pensions.
(see Bernheim (2002)).
31More detailed results of these experiments are reported in the online appendix.
32These figure are for the cohort born in 1936, although other cohorts have similar values.
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The slower decline in life-cycle inequality is driven both by permanent differences in
earning profiles and rate of returns. We find that life-cycle wealth inequality declines
much less for households with flatter than steeper profiles. This is intuitive, as households
with flat profiles also have the lowest lifetime earnings, and fairly high replacement rates
from social security. This generates very low savings rates, which results in slow changes
in wealth inequality. In contrast, households with the steepest earning profiles (university
graduates) have highly unequal wealth early in life, as the steep expected earnings profile
leads many households to initially save little. Similarly, wealth inequality for households
with higher returns to savings varies relatively less over the life-cycle. This is due to the
fact that the high return pushes up the savings rates of low wealth households, while
the large wealth effect for household with relatively larger wealth early in life offsets the
incentives to save induced by high returns.
Figure 9: Age-Gini Coefficient of Retirement Wealth (Net Worth)
6 Conclusion
Do private pensions play an important role in shaping the U.S. retirement wealth distri-
bution? Our results suggest that the answer is yes. We find that incorporating a private
pension system calibrated to the U.S. leads to higher inequality in retirement net worth
and lowers the correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth. This moves
the predictions of the life-cycle model closer to the data, and helps account for why some
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households with high lifetime earnings have low net worth at retirement.
These findings are important for the debate over what factors drive the large het-
erogeneity in retirement wealth among households with similar lifetime earnings (Venti
and Wise (1998) and Hendricks (2007b)). Unlike Hendricks (2007b)), we find that the
incomplete market life-cycle model, extended to include private pensions, earnings pro-
file heterogeneity, and rate of return heterogeneity, can largely account for the large
differences in retirement wealth across households with similar lifetime earnings, and the
lifetime earnings-retirement wealth correlation. Our findings thus challenge an emerg-
ing view that preference heterogeneity across households and/or behavioral factors play
a large and essential role in quantitatively accounting for retirement wealth inequality
(Venti and Wise (1998), Lusardi (2000) and Hendricks (2007a)).
Our findings suggest that an important question for future work is a better under-
standing of the offset effect of private pensions on non-pension wealth. The pension
offset effect in the model is larger than in the data, especially for the highest deciles of
lifetime earners. One possible explanation, which we plan to explore in future research,
is that tax considerations associated with private pensions lead to differential pension
offset rates across income groups.
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Appendix: The PSID Data
This appendix describes the procedures underlying the data reported in Section 2.
Taxes. Federal and state income tax liabilities are calculated using the NBER’s
Taxsim program (http://www.nber.org/ taxsim/). Following Hendricks (2007b), we im-
pose a number of simplifying assumptions: (i) head and wife are married and file jointly;
(ii) the number of dependents is the number of children under age 18 in the family unit;
(iii) households take the standard deduction; (iv) labor income includes self-employment
income; and (v) capital gains are set to zero.
Pension Wealth: For defined contribution (DC) plans, we use the account balance.
For defined benefit (DB) plans, there are two cases:33
(i) Head or wife expects future benefits: If we have data on the amount of pension
benefits and frequency, we convert them to an annual amount. DB pension wealth is
equal to the annual amount times expected years of receiving benefits. For expected
years, we consider mortality risk and use a discount rate of 4% (discounted back to age
65); If we have data on percentage of pay, DB pension wealth is equal to the labor income
in current survey year times the percentage times expected years; If we have data on
lump sum payments, DB pension wealth is equal to the lump sum payments.
(ii) Head or wife currently receives benefits: DB pension wealth is equal to the annual
amount times expected years of receiving benefits.
If the respondent gives a report of “I don’t know” or “refuses” for pension, we assume
the value is zero.
33The present value of DB pensions for one household is unrealistically high given the household’s
lifetime earnings. We divided the value by 12 and obtain a reasonable replacement rate of about 30%.
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